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The passage beginning "Those who think .. . " to the end of the chapter is evidently parenthetical, because the difficulties about friendship raised just before, at bll-13, are taken up at the beginning of chapter two, and the pronoun in nF L au'Twv at b17 clearly refers back to these difficulties. Now what is puzzling about these parenthetical remarks is that the logical issues they raise do not seem to have been discussed earlier in EN. Burnet's comment on 9(Q Ogoev is: "It is vain to ask where." Aspasius conjectured that the reference was to lost portions of EN. Grant, who is followed by Stewart and Gauthier and Jolif, writes:
As there is no place in the Ethics where Aristotle has discussed this logical question before, a Scholiast [sc. Aspasius] says with regard to the last words of the paragraph: IOLXE 6? El(QlaftaL v Itoix nEntwx6ot Tdv NtxoIcaXE(wv. But most probably the words E'QlTaL b' VxiLcr aOtT)v are the interpolation of a copyist, who was perhaps thinking vaguely of Eth. II.viii.5, . . . Thus although several lines at the end of VIII. 1 have a parenthetical character, the last line alone is taken to be spurious, on the grounds that there is no passage earlier in EN to which it might appropriately be taken to refer. Let us call this line of thought the argument from "vacuous reference" (VR). Consequently, if some passage can be found that does consider logical issues of the sort raised here, then this argument for the inauthenticity of b15-6 loses its force.
Linguistic arguments
Yet there are independent arguments for the inauthenticity of the passage that are linguistic in character. These arguments are typically marshalled as secondary or supporting reasons for considering the sentence spurious. But it is important to see that they have little force on their own and are incapable of supporting the conclusion of spuriousness apart from VR. One argument concerns the use of ioE` with the genitive in b16 in the sense of "concerning"; another concerns what might seem to be an awkwardness in the proximity of bnirQ aivTdv and jm(t ac1Tdv at b16-7.
The argument based on the use of u'nE can be advanced with varying degrees of sophistication. The simplest is through guilt by association, so to speak, and runs as follows. In indisputably genuine works of Aristotle, un3tD is rarely used with the genitive and having the sense of "concerning";' Aristotle typically uses nqip with the genitive to mean "concerning". In ' In what follows, I shall use the abbreviation 'UniLr (= nrQL)' to mean 'V1'.tQ used with the genitive having the sense of "concerning", like nreL'. contrast, rnvE (= =Qi) is common in the Magna Moralia and the Rhetoric to Alexander -both spurious works. Because, then, WEEQ (= 3te) is rare in attested works and common in some spurious works, then -the argument runs -the occurrence of i'itcQ in place of nq:L at b16 gives some support to the suggestion that the sentence is spurious. Thus Gauthier and Jolif, after remarking that the logical issues of b13-5 were not discussed earlier, comment that this problem, ajout a' l'emploi de u?TQ pour EEQL, exceptionnel dans la langue d'Aristote, cf. plus haut, comm. sur 1,3, 1096a4, -a amene Grant, Ramsauer, Susemihl, Stewart a' voir dans ces mots une glose inauthentique (peut-ettre ins&r&e en mauvais place) (p. 669).
Mere infrequency, of course, cannot establish spuriousness. And, as Dirlmeier remarks (p. 512), that Aristotle might have used nVi'Q for nEQL is settled by two occurrences of VintXQ (= rtQe) in Plato, at Apol. 39el and Legg. 776e7. But neither can it be maintained that the mere occurrence of V1eQ (= teQL) in a sentence lends a degree of probability to the claim that the sentence is inauthentic. Although 'tEe (= 7r,() is indeed infrequent in authentic works,2 some of its occurrences are undoubtedly authentic. For example, although 6 of the 7 occurrences in the Categories are found in the clearly spurious bridge passage to the postpraedicamenta, llblO-6, the other occurrence, at 11a20, is significant, since it is in the first person plural: O"u &L be' TcQataEcTraL RT5 T L lTif [Lag qll u7EIQ tOL6T11To 'v nQoQ6?h-OLV ToaE'VOg toAXX xxv JtQo6 TL ouyxaxaQL0jiFL1ThaL (11a20-2).3 And some of the occurrences in EN are beyond suspicion, such as 11 12a21, 22, and 1172a25.4 One finds in the Aristotelian corpus both authentic and inauthentic occurrences of iVire (= nEQL); further argument is required to sort the disputed sentence into one class or the other.
A more sophisticated argument might be based on the observation that many of the occurrences of OteQ the 28 occurrences of Un?Q (= nEQ) are with 3EQL' nearby and can be accounted for in this way.6 Another reason concerns the different connotations of iUnF and 3tnQ, the former suggesting an approach to something from above, the latter an approach to something on its own level. This would seem to be the reason why Aristotle sometimes uses bntL: rather than tEQL' in contexts that involve judgment and law.7 These contexts account for an additional 2 occurrences. And it might be for similar reasons that inEQ (= nEpi) is sometimes used in editorial remarks that are methodological in character, btlQ expressing better the metatheoretic viewpoint momentarily adopted. Now in 1155bl5-16 reasons of the sort just considered why Aristotle might prefer 'nu?Q over n3tE are operative, and thus "there is no reason to doubt the genuineness" of the passage. For rQL' is nearby; and because Aristotle is adopting a metatheoretic viewpoint, and is, moreover, referring to a prior verdict on a disputed logical point, 1UnEiQ takes the sense of an approach to a subject from above. So i'ritQ is an appropriate and not unaccountable word to find in this passage.
These points will become even clearer after we examine the second linguistic argument, which concerns the proximity of iUx'r?pQ akdv and 3_tQ auTxv at b16-7. Grant puts the point this way: "these words [sc. V?r-Q acuxdv] spoil the grammar of the sentence, as ntQE aczUTiv is used in the next line with a different reference." Stewart expands the argument: "for UnEQ awTdv must be equivalent to nEQt ToiU ?L8EXEOaL
Tlo R&Xkov xvi ,1Tov xaiL T'a gEQa t4, EME?, while n,rQ avwurv in the next line (b17) refers to 'a Tie; pLXBlag sI6r". The argument, then, seems to be the following. Were nE(i aiU Tv to occur in each of two successive sentences, it would be natural, if not necessary, to understand au'Twv to be referring to the same thing in each occurrence; whereas there would be a certain awkwardness and unclarity in having the reference for aw-rv change across the two occurrences. The use of utiL: aivr6,v at b16 as equivalent to nEQt alwv brings about this sort of awkwardness and unclarity, which is more charitably attributed to the misguided efforts of an interpolator than to a nodding Aristotle.
The proper answer to this argument, it seems to me, is to note that the reference attributed to a pronoun by a reader is highly dependent upon In this passage, UntEQ Toi'TWv is equivalent to 7trEQ TV TEXVdV, whereas lQL ... TIV in the next line either has an indeterminate reference or is equivalent to nQEi . . . TWv 6oxoiUvTwv. Note that here as well Aristotle exploits the different connotations of the prepositions, using 1cE'Lr for the relationship of examining a discipline, as from above, and nEQC for the relationship of "having to do with" a discipline, as from around it. The second linguistic argument fails, then, because there is no awkwardness or ambiguity in the proximity of &U?EL acvxdv and UEeQ aWJTOJv at 1155b16-7. The use of bnkQ rather than nrQi at b16 is stylistically sound, and it aids in clarifying the referent of the pronoun it governs. It provides no grounds for considering b15-6 spurious. Let us then put linguistic concerns ' I think it most plausible to understand nELAi aWtCv as having a determinate reference, and as referring to the difficulties about friendship raised in b9-13; but Burnet's remark (ad loc.) that the phrase is "quite general. 'The subject may be cleared up.' " needs to be taken seriously. Note, however, that if we understand the phrase in this way, there would be no difficulty at all concerning ambiguity of reference, and the second linguistic argument cannot even get off the ground. aside and return to the argument from Vacuous Reference, for the case for inauthenticity rests on this.
The Internal Arguments
What is the logical issue that is raised by the parenthetical remarks at 1155bl3-6? The answer to this question is found in the expression EntbE?XETaL T6 .tiakxov xai iATTOV, "admits of more-and-less". Now T6o 1takkov xavi ATTOV is an expression that is used in Plato and Aristotle to indicate variation in degree. For example, in the Philebus (24a-25a, cp. Phys. 189blO-6), Plato takes the presence of variation in degree to be a mark of the indeterminate or unlimited: "When we find things becoming 'more' or 'less' so-and-so, or admitting of terms like 'strongly', 'slightly', 'very', and so forth, we ought to reckon them all as belonging to a single kind, namely that of the Unlimited." (24e-5a). And Aristotle describes various sorts of commonplace arguments (oti OV ,&Aov xaL iTTov 1T6otL) that make use of variation in degree in the Topics (127bl7ff, 137bl4ff) and the Rhetoric (1358al4ff, 1397al2ff). But the phrase EbELEXETaL To ,Xakkov xai iTnTov is found, besides 1155bl3-16, only in the Categories, where it is used to indicate, as in the Philebus, the possibility of comparative predication, Aristotle concluding that substance admits of it in one way and in another does not (1b33-4a8), that quantity does not (6a19-25), that some relatives do (6b19-25), some qualities do (10b26-11a14), and action and passion do (11b2-7).9 What Aristotle has in mind seems to be roughly this: to say that a category admits of more-and-less is to say that comparative predications within that category are possible. This view may be stated more precisely as follows. Consider a predicate 'F' in a category C; C admits of more-and-less if and only if either of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(i) for a single individual x at two different times tl and t2, some claims of the form "x at tl is more (or less, or as'?) F as x at t2" are either true or false; (ii) for two individuals x and y at a single time, some claims of the form 'x is more (or less, or as) F as y" are either true or false.
9 It is important to understand 1155b13-6 in light of Aristotle's general procedure in the Categories and not only in relation to a single passage, as do Grant and Irwin. Grant refers us only to Cat. viii.36. Irwin remarks, concerning 1155bl5-6, "These words are probably spurious; they may refer to Catg. 6b20-7." Needless to say, it is arbitrary to select only one of the Categories passages as relevant. 10 Two things are comparable also if one is as F as the other. This case is usually omitted by Aristotle, but that he intends to include it is clear from i' 6tmio(o at Top. 107b13 and 17.
I adopt here the view that a category is a class, or kind, of predicate, "I so that a predicate "in a category C" is simply one that is an instance of that kind of predicate. Also, note that when either condition is fulfilled, a category admits of more-and-less because a predicate in that category does. Hence, these conditions are conditions of types of predicates admitting more-andless. So, for example, because one individual can be darker than another, or a single individual can be darker than itself at another time, the predicate 'dark' admits of more-and-less, and, consequently, so does the category of which 'dark' is an instance, viz. quality.
The name of a category can itself by used as a predicate, as when one says of something or of a kind of thing that it is a relation, or a quality, or a substance. And it is in this way only that Aristotle allows that the category of substance admits of more-and-less: of the group. He says that, of individuals, species, and genera, individuals are most of all substances (2a1 1), and species are more substance than genera (2b7-21).'2 But predicates in the category of substance do not admit of more-and-less.
Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that any given substance is not called more, or less, that which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man.'3 For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. Substance, however, is not spoken thus. For a man is not called more a man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less. (3b33-4a9).
We might, then, distinguish two ways in which something may admit of more-and-less. Let us call the way in which pale admits of more-and-less "Type I" variation in degree and the way in which substance admits of more-and-less "Type II" variation in degree.'4 " These kinds of predicates, however, correspond to kinds of existents, so that, roughly, true predication of a predicate in category C to an individual implies the existence of that kind of thing in the individual. 12 Note that since 'species' and 'genera' are relative terms, in the sense that the genus of one species can in turn be the species of another genus, there are many 'degrees' of substance, and the more general the genus, the less a substance it is. 13 I understand Aristotle's position to be not that it is false to say "Jones is more a man than Smith" but that this claim has no truth-value. (It is not as though Jones is a man to the same degree as Smith.) The equality that human beings have and that is expressed in just states of affairs (EN V. 1-2) is not a coincidence in degree of a characteristic, in the way that many tokens might have exactly the same intensity of a color.
What is the difference between these two types of variation? Type I variation is grounded in comparative predications concerning individuals: it is because some individual is more F than another, or more F than itself at another time, that the predicate 'F' and the category C that 'F' is in "admit of more-and-less." But Type II variation is not so grounded, because secondary substances are not individuals. "Socrates is more a substance than man is a substance" is not a comparative claim about individuals. The comparison seems to have its origin in theory rather than observation: in Type II comparisons, it seems, a comparison, or ranking, is first effected at the level of some higher kind, and then applied to lower kinds or, if possible, to individuals. In the case of substances, Aristotle first sets down the principle that one kind of substance is primary and others secondary, on the theoretical basis that the former "are subjects for everything else" (2b37-3al) in the sense that "if [they] did not exist it would be impossible for any other things to exist." (2b6)15 Then a species is said to be more substance than the genera under which it falls because it reveals the primary substances more, and , most importantly, because an analogy can be established of the form, primary substance: secondary substance:: species: genus. (2b7-22) Comparative claims about instances of these ranked kinds are then justified via these orderings. "Man is more a substance than animal" because: man is a species and animal is a genus, and species are more substance than genera because they are analogous to primary substances. The claim that "man is more substance than animal" is not established by inspecting human beings and other animals, or by comparing one's humanity and one's animality.
It is useful to have an example before us of how Type II variation might be extended to claims about individuals. Aristotle divides quantity into discrete and continuous quantity, not ranking these kinds (4b20-2). Suppose we were to adopt, hypothetically, the view that discrete quantity is primary, continuous secondary. 16 Thus, although we might agree that there 14 I choose these inelegant labels in order not to prejudge any philosophical questions with a phrase. Donald Morrison, in an important discussion, refers to what I style "Type I" variation as variation "in intensity", which seems accurate, but this then leaves us with the difficult task of finding a corresponding, non-controversial label for Type II variations: see his "The Evidence for Degrees of Being in Aristotle," Classical Quarterly 37 (ii) 382-401 (1987). Is That is, he uses the argument for priority known as o1uvavaCQEoLg. Cf. Met. 1019al-4, and Emile de Stryker, "On the first Section of Fragment 5a of the Protrepticus" in I. During and G.E.L. Owen, eds., Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth Century (Goteborg, 1960), pp. 93-7. 16 This is not an outlandish suggestion, given the theory of the continuum developed in is no Type I variation in quantity and hence no true or false comparisons of that sort ("This three is more three than that three"), we would then allow comparisons of another sort. Looking at a group of three pennies, for example, and comparing them with three inches of a copper strip, we might say the former three was "more a quantity" than the latter. This claim would be true, not because of what we saw in the pennies and copper, but because the former is an instance of discrete quantity, the latter of continuous, and, by hypothesis, discrete quantity is more quantity than continuous quantity.
A second difference would seem to be that the predicate used in assertions of Type I variation must be applied synonymously to the two things compared -that is, the things compared must be synonyms'7 -but not in the second case. A Type I comparison such as "x is more F than y" can be expanded to "x is more F than y is F," which implies "x is F" and "y is F." The requirement of synonymy is the requirement that the predicate 'F' be used in the same way in each case. For in a Type I comparison the individuals compared need to have the same feature, and in the same way, for the comparative claim to be either true or false.
However, in Type II comparisons, the individuals or kinds compared are compared in virtue of a ranking or ordering of the kinds of which each is an instance. Of course these kinds could be related to each other as species under some common genus, in which case the characteristics shared by all members of that genus would be shared by all instances of the species of that genus, and then the things compared would be synonyms. For example, suppose that, among species of animal, the species man is primary and the others secondary. Then, given this theoretical ordering, a Type II comparative claim such as the following would be true "This man is more of an animal than that horse". This comparison implies "This man is an animal" and "That horse is an animal", and the predicate 'animal' is used synonymously in the two cases.
Yet it is not necessary that the kinds that are ranked be related as species under a common genus. If we take as fundamental his remarks about the analogy of primary substance and species (2bl7-9), this would seem to be Aristotle's view of the relation of primary and secondary substance. His the last century by WeierstraB and Dedekind. 17 Cat. 1a6-10. Aristotle speaks of things rather than words being homonyms, synonyms, or paronyms, and I follow this usage. Two things are synonyms if the same predicate can be truly asserted of each, where the reason why the predicate is asserted of the thing (the view would seem not to be that there is a genus, substance, of which individuals, on the one hand, and species and genera, on the other, are species, in the way that man and horse are species of animal. Rather, his view seems to be that species and genera are, as it were, artificially grouped together with individuals, because the way in which species are related to genera of that species is analogous to the way in which individuals are related to species, and, purely in virtue of this analogy, species in a sense resemble individuals and can be grouped with them. This resemblance is not observable but rather a consequence of the theoretical relationship expressed in the analogy.
Thus, whereas in a Type I comparison there must be a strict resemblance in the things compared, in the sense that they are synonyms, and they share a characteristic or set of characteristics on which the comprison is based, in a Type II comparison the resemblance can be indirect, because the kinds of which the things compared are instances have been brought into relation with each other theoretically, as, for example, by establishing an analogy. In such comparisons, the things compared are not synonyms.
It should be noted that, although we have been discussing Type I and Type II comparisons with respect to categories of predication, and different ways in which categories can admit variation in degree, the distinction we have drawn can be generalized, and the conditions we have mentioned applied to predicates apart from any concern about the categories to which the predicates belong.
Turning now to 1 155bl3-6, we are in a position to see that the logical issue raised there is, roughly, whether the possibility of making comparative claims about friendship implies that there is only one kind of friendship. Aristotle denies that this is so, and the preceding discussion indicates why: he allows two different ways in which something can "admit of more-andless", and only one, that exhibited in Type I comparisons, implies that the things compared constitute a unified kind. For only in Type I comparisons is it the case that the things compared admit of comparison because they are synonyms and have shared characteristics.
According to this way of understanding the passage, Aristotle is not using the term Etbog in the technical sense of "species of a genus"; for, as we have noted, in this technical sense the term for the genus is predicated synonymously of all of the species under it, as well as of all of the instances of those species (cp. Top. 109b4-6, 123a29, 123a34, 126al7-20, 127b5-7) . Rather, Etbo; is used in a non-technical sense to mean something like "natural kind."'8 This use of dtbog is common in Aristotle"9 (and one finds a similar, non-technical use of yFvoo2"). Clear examples of it in EN would include 1145a16, 1174a16, 1174b5-6, and 1175a26-8. Thus, if the word is used in this way, to say that the things of which a term is truly predicated constitute a single Etbo; is to say that the term is predicated synonymously of them, in virtue of characteristics common among them; to deny this is to deny that the same word is predicated synonymously, in virtue of common characteristics. And applying the Categories definition of synonymy, we can say that, if things constitute an e?bog in this sense, then the word for that d6bo; is predicated of those things according to a single X6yo;. This is in fact the relationship between Etbo; and X6yog implicit in the discussion in EN 1.6. There Aristotle expresses his view that x&yaftv is not predicated xa{'6v Edbo; by saying, concerning good things, that bLaqeQov?Eg oL
X6yoL TaiT fj atyaith (1096b24-5).3
Now it is this very passage that, I believe, Aristotle is referring back to in VIII.1. But in order to see more clearly that this is so, it is useful to distinguish four different views, and two different sorts of confusion, which might be thought to underlie the remarks at 1155bl3-16. The four views are the following:
(1) "Comparability implies synonymy": If, when the same word is predicated of two things (or of one thing with itself at different times), comparisons can be made in the predication of that word, then the things of which the word is predicated are synonyms.
(2) "Non-comparability implies absence of synonymy": If, when the same word is predicated of two things (or of one thing with itself at different times), comparisons cannot be made in the predication of that word, then the things of which the word is predicated are not synonyms. 18 As Gauthier and Jolif remark, "on ne doitpas entendre dans ce passage le mot respece* (Etbo;) au sense technique d'especes d'un mtme genre: on aurait alors une notion univoque (la difiniuion du genre se realise identiquement dans les difftrent especes de ce genre, par example la notion d'animal est identique dans le cheval et dans l'homme), mais en un sens large et non technique." (p. 669) The commentary of Gauthier and Jolif on 1155bl4-15 is instructive, and, for the most part, they describe correctly the logical issue there raised, but they do not identify I.6 as the antecedent discussion, as I am maintaining here. 19 Bonitz' remark at 218a8-1 1 that -peculiaris ToV3 (3) is implied at Pol. 1259b36-8: "we cannot say that the difference is to be one of degree, for ruling and being ruled differ in kind (FLbr bLacpiEQE), and difference of degree is not difference in kind at all (TO be [&XXov xaiL fTov ou'6V)". Also, the contrapositive of (3) not relied upon an adequate sign (urli6ov txavvv)" should be taken to mean that such persons confuse the false principle (1) with the correct principle (2). In Aristotle, a o-%elov ixav6v is a mark that alone allows one to draw a particular conclusion.25 Non-comparability alone allows one to infer absence of synonymy, but comparability alone does not warrant the inference to synonymy, since in some circumstances comparisons among non-synonyms are possible.
Some commentators have focussed on (3) and (4) and have claimed that in 1155bl3-16 Aristotle is criticizing those who affirm (4). "The question at issue here is whether difference in degree excludes specific difference," Burnet remarks; Aristotle believes that "difference in degree can never constitute specific difference, Tb 11&XXov xaiL TTov is not ELbo7nOLOv . . . But it does not follow from this that difference in degree will exclude specific difference, though it may exclude generic" (p. 352). Stewart, citing Michelet, holds the same view (p. 270). Joachim's wide-ranging discussion concludes on a similar note: "All that we have here is the assertion that difference of degree and difference of kind are not incompatible"
(p. 245).26
The view that EN 11.8 is the intended reference of 1155bl5-16 is plausible, I think, only if it is assumed that Aristotle is concerned with rejecting (4). In 11.8, Aristotle explains that, corresponding to each moral virtue, there are two vices, one involving an excess (bncepokX), the other a defect (MXELVg), in an emotion or kind of action. Since virtues and vices differ in kind, a moral virtue and its corresponding vices would be an example of things that differed in kind and also in degree.
Yet even on the assumption that Aristotle is concerned with (3) and (4) at the end of VIII. 1, it is doubtful that the reference of that passage should be understood to be 11.8. For, as was noted, it is obviously true that things can Platon qui nous ont ete conserves un texte qui formulerait expressement l'argument que critique Aristote; mais il est sair que cet argument s'inscrit bien dans le prolongement de la theorie platonicienne de l'amitie telle que nous la font conna&tre notamment le Lysis et le Banquet; . . . " I Cp. the other three occurrences of the phrase: Meteor. 341a32; Phys. 222b22; Rhet.
1395a6. ' Dirlmeier describes the mistaken view thus: Wenn wir an irgendeinem Phanomen
Graddifferenzen beobachten, so bedeutet dies, dapi ein Substrat da sein mu,/, an dem sie sich sozusagen abspielen . . . (p. 512). This seems correct, since it appears to be an ontological manner of stating (1); yet Dirlmeier departs from this focus by next citing a variety of passages (Phil. 24e7, PA 644al2-23, Pol. 1249b36-38) and concluding that Aristotle is vaguely referring to discussions of that sort: Wir . . . werden die Unbestimmtheit des Ruckverweises um so eher in Kauf nehmen konnen, als die Horer ja wuliten: das ist bekanntes Gebiet. differ both in kind and degree, and it would hardly be necessary for Aristotle to refer back to his discussion of moral virtue to illustrate the point. Nor could it be held that II.8 is useful for illustrating the truth of (3) as against the falsity of (4). For that chapter would be useful for that purpose only if it strongly emphasized -as it does not -the role of the 6Qfto'g koyog in constituting the distinction between a virtuous action and the vicious excess or defect. For then it would be clear that it was not the mere JtFQpiokX or ?EMFXtX that was EL'60MLO However, as we have seen, Aristotle is actually concerned with (1) and (2), and there is nothing in the discussion of II.8 relevant to establishing the latter against the former. In particular, one finds no use of comparative claims in II.8, of the sort that Aristotle uses to justify or illustrate the claim that something "admits of more-and-less". Rashness is somehow characterized by excess, but Aristotle does not say that rashness is more rash than courage (for courage is not rash at all), or that rashness is more courageous than courage, or that courage is more a virtue, or less a vice, than rashness.28 To the rash man, Aristotle says, the brave man seems a coward (not "less courageous"'), to the coward he seems rash (not ''more courageous"') (1108bl9-20). Generally, it would seem that the use of &beQpok? and EXXk1EL; in I1.8, as applied to emotions and actions, signifies Type I variation. When one asserts that one person is more afraid now than he was before, or that one person is more afraid than another, 'afraid' is being used synonymously to pick out the same condition in each. Thus the sort of variation that underlies moral virtues and vices is not the sort that gives rise to the logical issues mentioned at the end of VIII. 1.
However, Aristotle's remarks about goods in the opening chapters of EN do give rise to these logical issues, which are explicitly discussed in I.6. From the opening sentences of EN, Aristotle shows a concern with comparisons of goods that are not synonyms. After saying that xakXd w tEcpylvavTo t&yaiE?v or n&vT' ?pietaL (1094a2-3),9 he immediately warns us that 27 It would seem that (3) implies that the doctrine of the mean cannot be understood as a rule for action, for then discovering the virtuous action could not be merely a matter of finding the right degree of something. Yet Aristotle is not concerned with arguing for this latter point in II.8. I myself tend to the view that the doctrine of the mean has a very limited role: it explains why there are two vices for each moral virtue, and it helps us in identifying those vices. ' Aristotle does admit that sometimes a vice of one extreme is more like the virtue, either in its own right or because of our propensities (1 108b35-1109al9) . But he does not express this view using comparatives, nor does it seem that he could do so. ("Rashness is less a vice than cowardice" won't work.) 2 A claim that could not constitute a "quantifier reversal" fallacy, as has sometimes been alleged, since Aristotle is not treating u&yacd6v as an individual to be described (as btaqpogac M, TLg qpaLVETaL TOV tEAv (a3-4). And then, in the course of developing his argument concering the highest good, he sets down various principles for comparing these different ends (and hence goods), among which are: i) A product is better than the activity that produces it. (peXt(w nbpuxe rG.v IVEQyELOwv T'a Iya) (1094a5-6) ii) When one discipline has another within its scope, the good which is the end of the former is better than the good which is the end of the latter. (1094al4-16) iii) If one thing is for the sake of another, the good of the latter is better than the good of the former. (1094a23 and 1095b29-30) iv) The good of a group is better than the good of a member of that group. (1094b8-10) This concern with comparisons among goods carries over into chapter 6, where the view that all goods are synonyms is criticized. It is true that nowhere in the chapter is the inference "goods are synonyms because comparisons of goods are possible" explicitly drawn and rejected. However, comparisons among goods are so important in the material that immediately precedes and follows 1.6, that it is not implausible to conclude that it is the problem of the possibility of making such comparisons that motivates the discussion of 1.6 and requires that the view there considered be rejected. Given that Aristotle allows that goods can be compared, the way in which he could show that the inference to the synonymy of goods is not necessary would be to show that goods are not synonymous, as he does in 1.6.
Although the inference to synonymy from comparability is not explicitly drawn in I.6, it may in fact underlie the difficult passage at 1096a34-b5. The passage is as follows: This passage can be understood as arguing that synonymy, far from underwriting comparability, in fact makes impossible the sort of comparative claims that those "who introduced the Ideas" (1096al3) wished to make, for if the Idea of a kind of thing has the same X6yo; as the members of that kind, then it cannot be better (R.t&kXov dyaco6v) than members of that kind.3' For things are good with respect to what they essentially are (this is would have to be the case, for it to be within the scope of the quantifiers), but rather as a predicate whose general use may thus be adumbrated. ? Note that at 1096b3-4 must be read as "more good" rather than "strictly good" or "good, rather", because of the comparative kevx6TeQov used in the illustration at 1096b4. assumed in the argument), but in this way the Idea and the members of the corresponding kind would not differ, hence neither would they differ with respect to goodness (Ft 6' oiino;, ot,6' ^ kyacno?v). Nor could it be claimed that the Idea of a kind is better than the members of that kind simply because it is eternal (1w4) &blOV EVat), for nothing has more of a characteristic (at some time) simply by having that characteristic (to some degree) forever. Thus, the sorts of comparatives that "those who introduced the Ideas" would like to make -i.e., those having the form "The Idea of F is better than a particular F') -are excluded, not underwritten by the thesis that the koyot of each are the same. In brief, Aristotle's point is that, if the possibility of making comparative claims of the form "The Ideas are better than that of which they are ideas" implies that the Ideas and the things of which they are Ideas have one and the same koyog, then it implies that the Ideas cannot be better -a contradiction.3"
In sum, EN 1.6 ought to be taken as the backward-reference of 1156b15-16, because there Aristotle argues against the view that goods are synonyms, which might be thought to follow from comparisons of goods, such as those Aristotle himself makes in the opening chapters of EN. And, as we have seen, this suggestion is confirmed by the kinds of expressions used in chapter 6 -for example, his assumption, in 1.6 as in VIII.1, that unity of Ed6og and identity of o6yog are equivalent to synonymy -and by what is implicit in the argument of 1096a34-b5.
Significance of this result
That the end of EN VIII.1 refers back to 1.6 is significant in at least three ways.
First, it suggests a new way of reading the beginning of 1.7, namely, as an explicit formulation of criteria for comparing goods, given the fact that Cgood' is not used synonymously. Often 1097a25-b21 is understood as a conceptual investigation of E1'&aL,ovLc;32 that is, it is understood to be an analysis arrived at in the case of a particular sort of good. However, since ibaLljov(a is simply the "most good" of those goods attainable through action, it would seem that what this is could not be discovered or discussed 31 On this reading of the passage, xi toTe xai iorkovtaL XEAyELV aiTotxaarov (1096a34-5) should be understood as wondering how partisans of the Ideas would predicate T&yaO6v of the Ideas: the Ideas must be better, but they cannot be if, in consequence of the comparison, they have the same X6yo;. 32 For example, J.L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia", in A. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Berkeley, Ca., 1980, pp. 20-22. without first setting down perfectly general criteria for comparing goods. And this is how, I suggest, we should understand Aristotle's concern with whether or not a thing is more complete (riXkEov), self-sufficient (ai'-TaQ)xg), and choiceworthy (aLQEtOv): one thing is "more good" than another if it is either more complete, or more self-sufficient, or more choiceworthy. (EvMazLRovLa is most good because it is most complete, most self-sufficient, and most choiceworthy.)
Because goods are not synonyms, comparisons of goods involve Type II variation. But this sort of comparison of individuals finds its justification in a ranking of those kinds of which the individuals are instances, and this ranking is achieved by ordering those kinds as regards completeness, selfsufficiency, and choiceworthiness. An example of how this might work is the following. Consider two pieces of brass pipe, the same in length, diameter, and quality of metal. Suppose that one is turned into a simple flute, by putting the appropriate sort of holes in it; the other is turned into a plumbing fixture, by threading the ends. Suppose, furthermore, that the labor -technical knowledge, time, physical force -required to make these changes is about the same in each case. The pipes before these changes were made were practically identical, and, if we consider them simply as pieces of brass, they are also very similar after the changes.
However, the changes serve to give a function (?Qyov) to each pipe, and, in virtue of this, each pipe can be located in a kind. We might then reason that the flute-pipe is better than the plumbing-pipe, because the kind to which the former belongs, musical instrument, is better than the kind to which the latter belongs, plumbing fixture. This claim about kinds might in turned be justified in this way. One instrument is better than another if the activity for which the former is an instrument is better than the activity of which the latter is an instrument; but if one activity is more complete than another it is a better activity; music playing is more complete than plumbing, and hence better; thus a musical instrument is better than an instrument for plumbing. This is simply an example, and nothing hinges on its details. The point is that comparisons of goods, since they involve Type II variation, will not be justified by observation of comparable characteristics but rather by a theoretical ranking of kinds, and that completeness, self-sufficiency, and choiceworthiness, on this interpretation, are criteria for arriving at this sort of theoretical ranking.33 33 That comparisons of goods take place via theoretical rankings helps to explain the Aristotelian notion that something that is better may accidentally be worse. For example, Aristotle says that pleurisy is worse than a stumble, even if it happens that a stumble Note that the hypothesis that Aristotle is setting down general criteria for comparing goods in 1.7 helps to explain why completeness, self-sufficiency, and choiceworthiness are brought into play later in the Ethics for goods other than evbaL[ov'a. For example, friendship bLa' 6o &yafc6v is characterized, in contrast to the other kinds of friendship, as complete (1156b7,34), self-sufficient (1156b6-10),34 and choiceworthy (1157b26) .
Second, Aristotle's division of friendship into three kinds needs to be understood in light of the discussion of 1.6. If 'good' need not be predicated synonymously, so that various kinds of goods do not necessarily fall under a larger kind, in the way in which species divide a genus, then the three kinds of good that are the basis of the three kinds of friendship -to ayaf6v, T'o M, TO XQT1L[LOV -likewise need not be united under a larger genus. Since friendship is divided into kinds according to the goods loved in a friendship (1156a6-10), it might be the case, then, that there is no overarching genus of which the three kinds are species. This would imply that there is no common characteristic that would be constitutive of friendship in all three cases, such as Euvota, as John Cooper has suggested.35 But, I believe, not only is it possible that the kinds of friendship should be understood in this way, a full comparison of VIII.2-3 and I.6 requires it. For it seems to be Aristotle's view that friendship bLat IO ayaf*v stands to the other kinds of friendship as a good in the category of substance stands to a good in the category of accident;' yet goods in different categories, Aristotle tells us in I.6, are not synonyms (1096al7-29).37 A corrollary of this point is that, since I.6 is directed against Platonists, and since VIII. 1 depends upon 1.6, it would seem that at least the part of the books on friendship where he distinguishes the three kinds of friendship (VIII.2-5) was viewed by Aristotle as a rejection of and alternative to a Platonic understanding of friendship and love, according to which goods during a retreat means that a man is imprisoned or executed. (1138bl-5) Only the ranking of the kinds RELkEt Tfl TXNV (1138b2). Cp. 1094bl4-19; and the notion of tE nk(bs &yacEtd at 1129b3-6. 3 Aristotle does not apply a word such as aU'TaQxeg to friends bt'a -6 &yaf6v, but his frequent comments that the goods of such friendships are within the friends themselves and not adventitious (which fact accounts for the stability of such friendships), seem to express a similar idea. and beautiful things are "homogeneous", as Martha Nussbaum has put it.38 Even if we agree with Anthony Price39 that the ascent passage of the Symposium should not be read as supposing or implying the homogeneity of beauty (and thus, presumably, of goodness), and thus there is no reason to attribute that view to Plato; nevertheless, it would seem, from VIII. 1 read in the light of I.6, that followers of Plato understood the ascent passage in this way, and perhaps Aristotle even believed that Plato was in some sense philosophically bound to adopt that view.40
Third, and finally, the connection between VIII. 1 and 1.6 here argued for is an indication of the unity of books I and VIII and thus, by transitivity, of any books in EN with which these form a unity. Moreover, the striking brevity of the remark at 1155bl5-16 seems to imply that Aristotle is presupposing a sure familiarity with the earlier discussion and a confident grasp of its implications. And this point in turn suggests that some references and allusions in EN may be subtle and difficult to detect, so that they have hitherto gone unrecognized; furthermore, our recognizing them may in some cases depend upon our having recognized some other connection. To give an example: On the assumption that book I forms a unity with the entire discussion of friendship in VIII and IX, it becomes plausible to link together Aristotle's apologia for criticizing his philosophical friends at the opening of 1.6 (1096allll-17) with his remarks in IX.1 about the importance of showing reverence and piety toward those with whom one has studied philosophy (1 164b2-6): the latter remarks would require that something like an apologia be included in the earlier passage. It seems to me not unlikely that much of the evidence for the integrity of the Ethics, like this example, can be discerned only once it is appropriately sought4l. 
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